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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DONALD FRANCIS DUNLAP, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20080923-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Dunlap challenges the trial court's denial of his Motion in Limine to Exclude 
Intoxilyzer Results (R. 90) and his repeated objections to the introduction of the results at 
trial, arguing that the State failed to demonstrate adequate assurances of reliability, that 
the trial court improperly admitted the results in violation of the Administrative Code and 
the Rules of Evidence, and that these failures constituted a harmful error. A trial court's 
interpretation of a statute that controls the admission of evidence presents a question of 
law that is reviewed for correctness. See Salt Lake City v. Emerson, 861 P.2d 443 
(Ut.App. 1993) ("whether a statute prevents the admission of evidence depends on its 
interpretation, and the trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a question of law"). 
See also State v. Garcia, 965 P.2d 508, 511 (Ut.App. 1998). The standard of review on 
the admissibility of hearsay requires a review of legal questions under a correctness 
standard and questions of fact under a review for clear error. Salt Lake City v. George, 
2008 UT App 257, \ 5, 189 P.3d 1284, 1286. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All controlling statutory provisions are set forth in full in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Donald Dunlap was charged by information filed in Fifth District Court on 
October 11, 2005 with Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-502; No Evidence of Security, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-12a-303.2; and Driving on 
Suspension, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 53-3-227 (R. 
1-2). Dunlap waived his right to a preliminary hearing and pled not guilty to the charges 
(R. 18,20). 
On April 13, 2006 the State filed a notice of intent to call Gaylen Moore. Certified 
Breath Test Technician, as an expert witness at trial (R. 51). 
On August 14, 2008 Dunlap filed a motion in limine to exclude the results of the 
intoxilizer test conducted at the jail on the grounds that the machine failed to produce a 
printout card indicating air volume and blood or breath alcohol content, and that the 
required operational checklist for both tests was incomplete (R. 90). 
A jury trial was held on August 18-19, 2008 (R. 100-03, 104-07, 137, 138). After 
deliberation the jury convicted Dunlap of DUI and No Evidence of Security (R. 122-23). 
The Driving on Suspension charge was dismissed (R. 105). 
Dunlap was sentenced to 36 months probation including 62 days in the 
Washington County Jail and a $2,000 fine (R. 125-26). 
On October 17, 2008 Dunlap filed a notice of appeal in Fifth District Court (R. 
128). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Testimony of Roger Randall 
On October 9, 2005 Roger Randall saw Dunlap outside of Enterprise in 
Washington County (R. 137: 54-55). He was coming from church and saw a small truck 
in the road stopped about halfway down the hill (R. 137: 56). To pass the truck he was 
required to slow down and go a couple feet off the road (R. 137: 56, 64). Dunlap was in 
the driver's seat of the truck (R. 137: 56). 
Roger saw the truck move sideways across the road through his rearview mirror 
(R. 137: 57). Concerned that Dunlap's truck may get hit by another car, Roger turned 
around (R. 137: 57). As he did so, Dunlap backed off the road and went down about 6-7 
feet off the road into the grass and weeds, turning at the bottom so the truck was parallel 
to the road (R. 137: 57, 75). Roger testified that Dunlap "was lucky [the truck] didn't tip 
over.... [H]e had to go perfectly straight off for that truck not to roll over when he went 
off that hill" (R. 137:58). 
He approached Dunlap and asked if he was all right (R. 137: 58). The engine was 
running and the tires were spinning in the grass (R. 137: 69-70). Roger testified he could 
smell alcohol and that he asked Dunlap if he'd been drinking (R. 137: 58). Dunlap told 
Roger to leave and that he had called some friends to come and help him get back on the 
road (R. 137: 58). Roger returned to his car and called his wife, Judy Randall, who was 
on duty (R. 137:59). 
Roger waited from outside his house, a short distance away, for his wife to arrive 
in order to ensure that Dunlap didn't drive (R. 137: 59, 71). 
B. Testimony of Judy Randall 
Judy Randall is an officer with the Washington County Sheriffs Office (R. 137: 
76-77). On October 9, 2005 she received a call from her husband (R. 137: 77-78). She 
responded to the location approximately 23 minutes later and saw a small truck down off 
the hill on the east side of the roadway (R. 137: 78). 
She located Dunlap lying on the ground on the driver's side (R. 137: 79). Dunlap 
denied being injured and admitted to drinking "one beer" (R. 137: 79). Judy could smell 
alcohol (R. 137: 79). She assisted him to his feet and requested his driver's license, 
registration and proof of insurance (R. 137: 80). Dunlap indicated that he did not have a 
driver's license because of his eyesight (R. 137: 80). Sometime later an identification 
card was located (R. 137: 80). Dunlap also explained that he did not have insurance and 
that he had purchased the truck but it was not yet registered (R. 137: 80). 
While speaking with him, Judy noticed a strong odor of alcohol on his breath, that 
he had urinated in his pants and that his zipper was down (R. 137: 81). His speech was 
slurred and slow (R. 137: 81). He was also unable to stand by himself (R. 137: 81). 
Judy attempted to administer field sobriety tests to Dunlap. On the horizontal gaze 
nystagmus test Dunlap continued to stare straight ahead instead of following the object 
, ,
 ; ) j e c t 
12 15 inches away (R. 137: 113). She did not use the walk and turn or one-leeeed stand 
tests on Dunlap because she felt it was "unsafe" because of his poor balance and u 
inline! IUH!\\ p I mini ,nnl lliuil |Ii|c wouldii I have been able to do it " (R 13 5 :: MM "hill) 
Judy administered a portable breath ic: v * 
137: 92-93). She testified that Dunlap "was the most intoxicated person [she's] ever 
dealt with' (I » 
Dunlap I'uii I minly l;nl (I11 I Jli "' 'Ml 
At the jail, Judv requested Dui
 l ^ a breath test on the intoxilyzer 5000 machine 
( • t .sue had checked his mouth before the portable test and noticed nothing in 
it before itdmiiir (ctuii11 (li<1 mlo\il\vri les! 1H 13 5 :: 9- =• to administei the 
test (R. 137: 95). Judy ran down the checklist and made two records for two attempts to 
administer the intoxilyzer breath test {See State's Exhibits 3 & 4) (R. P"7: 9t r ps 1 
and H in iilllii i !in I lis! w m1 iinnl rnmplded because the machine is typically leit on (K, 
137: 98). 
Judy testified that she had difficulty in having Dunlap blow into the machine (R. 
1 * -. iiuiij; w, iii;;.iwuv a;, a^iuu. vx*^*^ ?h »,«v itidiiniic when \w was 
not reallv blow i 
have us believe that he was actually blowing" (R. 137: iOlj. The machine did not 
receive a sufficient amount of air for a sample and the machine kept repeating "Please 
blow, please blow" (R. 137: 100). If the machine does not receive a sufficient sample in 
three minutes it shuts don and shows a "refusal" (R. 137: 101). 
On the first test, the machine indicated that the sample was insufficient (R. 137: 
103). The card printout of the results of the test, which shows the calibrations and the air 
blanks as well as the time and amount of alcohol breath, printed crooked and was 
unreadable (See State's Exhibit 5) (R. 137: 103, 105). 
Judy then shut down the machine in the hopes of correcting the problem with the 
printer before administering a second test (R. 137: 106). She again filled out the 
checklist but failed to check the first box even though she testified to turning the machine 
on (R. 137: 106, 117-18). She testified that again Dunlap did not blow into the machine 
as directed (R. 137: 108). Again the card came out crooked and unreadable (State's 
Exhibit 6) (R. 137: 109). However, despite again receiving an insufficient sample, Judy 
testified that the machine registered a .180 on the second test (R. 137: 102; 138: 190). 
She did not offer Dunlap a blood test or urinalysis, which also could have given her the 
evidence she was seeking (R. 137: 118). 
While in the process of concluding the DUI form, Dunlap requested to use the 
bathroom (R. 137: 111). Deputy Thompson stepped up to assist Dunlap and he stood for 
a second then changed his mind and sat back down (R. 137: 110-11). She asked if he was 
okay and Dunlap replied he would "piss [his] pants" instead, which he did (R. 137: 112). 
C. Testimony of Gaylin Moore 
Gaylin Moore is assigned to the Utah Highway Patrol breath alcohol testing 
division (R. 138: 142). He manages the intoxilyzer machines for the southern part of the 
state, including Washington County viv. u o . i t n / . l ie t *M-.ii -d thai (Ih maiiiinr <".ih ,iii\e 
results—that tests can be run -even without the printei working properly or beinti turned 
<m (I"! I '"' X I I " 'in I (« 11 H)ic testified that the foi - -• >h tilings need to happen betoi-, the 
machine will f111mi( • i < .111<Mi 1 M1in (11n i• Iu(. 1 o 1 n • • i 11f 1 i< i< • 11! 1111< 1111mII i » I i n 11i< 11mII a 
h a l f a l i t e i 1 vi- c ':<ev have to blow for a minimum amount of time—approximately four 
seconds rhii d. .nc aROhoi icvel cannot be rising more than .005 percent per second (R. 
138: 1 78) ! ri ill1 i  i (Ti r it nil .jmpli1 ' i i ir ins l l in , ' nr lill MINI1 III ml i in iii'lii II II in, \ fun* I quit 
blowing before they met the third requirement" (R. 138: 180). 
Moore introduced evidence of the machine's maintenance records (R. 138 1 S4; 
Sec i" I;*" * , x s«M . v asiuiigtv)!. uumy macnine was 
working proper!> on o o t o b e r i , 2005 (R. 138. 153->1 * *  1 
and fixed uie printer the papei feed sensoi was out o* aln n i *< 138 ' ^H\ He indicated 
this pro!'l-,iM " '"ii " JI 1 a lkvl (lie accuracy of the machine (R 138: 158-59). 
D. Testimony ol Aaron lhompson 
Aaron "? hompson -•<:. ieputy with the Washington County Sheriffs Office (R. 
1 >er of 200:) ne was assigned to the booking department at the jail. I le 
was present when \\u\\ Itioiipiil iHiiiil ip IIIIIII iiiiiii mllisi n n l dim I N I M H I V H leslll I ' I I 
85). He testified "Deputy Randall explained the entire process to him on how to blow in 
the machine and w hen to blow in the machine, rTT]e attempted to blow in the inach ine 
\\M (iiflnvnif I it in M BS ,iml W.LS playing gai - nig lliih lie \\a;s blow IIIJJ;' (l< II IK 
185). Thompson testified no air was gome into the maennu M 
Thompson did not see the numbers on the screen from the first insufficient sample 
(R. 138: 186). The machine started to print and the card got stuck inside in the printer (R. 
138: 186). He watched the second test after the machine had been restarted and watched 
the numbers increase from .000 up to .180 (R. 138: 187). Thompson also witnessed 
Dunlap urinate in his pants (R. 138: 189). 
Thompson testified that Dunlap told him that a female hooker from Las Vegas had 
been driving his truck (R. 138: 191). Dunlap also told him that he was driving into 
Enterprise to pick up dog food (R. 138: 192). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
For the trial court to admit the results of the intoxilyzer tests performed upon 
Dunlap the State is required to provide adequate assurances as to the reliability of the test 
conditions and the testing device. See State v. Vialpando, 2004 UT App. 95 ^ 14. 
Because the evidence presented did not demonstrate reliability the court should not have 
found the test reliable or presented the test results to the jury. Furthermore, the trial court 
should have excluded the intoxilyzer test results because the results were admitted in 
violation of the the Utah Administrative Code and the Utah Rules of Evidence as hearsay 
without an exception. See UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.714-500-7(C) (2008), UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 41-6a-516, Harry v. Schwendiman, 740 P.2d 1344 (Ut.App. 1987), Kehl v. 
Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413 (Ut.App. 1987). Finally, admission of the intoxilyzer test 
results constituted a prejudicial error because there is a substantial likelihood that the 
error affected the outcome of Dunlap's case. See State v. Preece, 971 P.2d 1, 7 (Ut.App. 
1998). See also State v. Kinne, 2001 UT App. 373. 
ARGUMENT 
According to Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-502 there are three ways for the State 
to prove driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. "A person may not operate or 
be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state if the person (a) has sufficient 
alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the person has 
blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test; (b) is 
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any 
drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or (c) has 
a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of operation or 
physical control." UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-502. In order to be convicted under § 41-
6a-502 either a blood or breath alcohol test must be administered, either at the time of 
physical control or at some subsequent time, and admitted, or there must be evidence that 
the defendant driver was incapable of safely operating the vehicle due to intoxication. 
Dunlap challenges the validity of his conviction based on the improper admission of 
breath alcohol test results and the sufficiency of the remaining evidence of incapacity. 
POINT I 
The court should not have accepted any evidence of the intoxilyzer test 
results because the State did not prove the reliability of the intoxilyzer. 
The requirements for proving the reliability of intoxilyzer evidence were 
established in Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Utah 1983) and then 
readdressed in State v. Vialpando, 2004 UT App. 95. In Hall the Utah Supreme Court 
found that a trial court may presume validity of breath test evidence if the State produces 
affidavits regarding the maintenance of the specific machine as evidence of its accuracy. 
Hall 663 P.2d at 1320. That presumption was codified in Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-
515 where the Commissioner for the Department of Motor Vehicles is given power to set 
standards for administering chemical tests. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-515(l). 
In Vialpando an officer approached the defendant in his vehicle and noted slurred 
speech, bloodshot eyes and the strong smell of alcohol. Vialpando at % 3. Vialpando was 
arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and was asked whether he would 
consent to an intoxilyzer test. Vialpando agreed and the result of that breath test was a 
.175. Id. at ^ 5. At trial Vialpando was convicted of driving under the influence of 
alcohol and he appealed the trial court's admission of the intoxilyzer test results claiming 
that the State failed to make the required foundational showing and that the trial court 
therefore erred in concluding that the test results were admissible. Id. at % 13. 
This Court reviewed Vialpando's claim for an abuse of discretion. Id. The Court 
ruled that in order to admit the results of an intoxilyzer test a trial court must require the 
State to present evidence "that: (1) the into the intoxilyzer machine had been properly 
checked by a trained technician, and that the machine was in proper working condition at 
the time of the test; (2) the test was administered correctly by a qualified operator; and (3) 
a police officer observed the defendant during the fifteen minutes immediately preceding 
the test to ensure that the defendant introduced nothing into his or her mouth during that 
time." Vialpando at f^ 14 (emphasis added). Vialpando challenged that the arresting 
officer failed to satisfy the observation requirement but the Court found that the trial 
court's finding that the officer had properly checked Vialpando's mouth and properly 
observed him was within the trial court's discretion. 
In this case Dunlap challenges the trial court's finding that the test results were 
admissible because the State failed to show that the machine was in proper working order 
at time of the test. In fact the court's own words show it was clear that the machine was 
not in proper working condition when it said that "Deputy Randall's testimony [was] 
absolutely conclusive that [the] machine was acting up" (R. 137: 126-7). Randall's 
testimony was that the printer was malfunctioning at the time the test was performed (R. 
137: 106, 109). One of the standards for administering chemical tests set by the 
commissioner is that the "[r]esults of breath alcohol concentration tests will be printed by 
the instrument." UTAH ADMIN. r.714-500-7(C). The printer malfunction violated this 
standard and thus the machine was not functioning properly. 
This malfunction, according to Vialpando, should have precluded the trial court 
from admitting the test results. The trial court's discretion should not have extended to 
ignoring undisputed evidence that the machine was not functioning properly at the time 
of the test. The fact that Trooper Gaylin Moore later testified that he repaired the 
machine in Purgatory on October 11, 2005 only reinforces Dunlap's claim that the 
machine was not functioning properly. Moore testified "the paper feed sensor was out of 
align" (R. 138: 158). He said that if "the printer sensor is not working, it will either stop 
it and then just print over the top of itself or feed it clear through to the maximum deal 
and print over the top of itself' (R.138: 158). He said "that," presumably referring to the 
sensor, "was not working" (R. 138: 158). Because the evidence clearly demonstrated that 
the machine was not in "proper working condition at the time of the test" the trial court 
erred in admitting the test results. Vialpando at f^ 14. 
Dunlap also claims that the results of the tests should have been inadmissible 
under Vialpando because the State failed to show that the test was administered correctly. 
Randall testified that she has been trained and certified to administer the intoxilyzer and 
has administered it many times (R. 137: 95). She testified that she used the checklist to 
record the tests and those checklists were introduced into evidence (R. 137: 96, see 
State's Exhibit 3 and 4). Despite the fact that Deputy Randall may have been qualified to 
perform the tests and completed the operational checklists, her testimony clearly 
demonstrates that during both tests Dunlap failed to provide a sufficient sample proving 
that the test was not administered correctly. Dunlap was "not really blowing" but "filling 
his cheeks with air in an attempt to have us believe that he was actually blowing" (R. 
137: 100-1). 
On the first attempt the machine recognized that Dunlap was not blowing 
correctly, that the test was not being administered correctly, because the machine 
continued to display "Please blow, please blow" (R. 137: 101). On the second attempt 
"he exhaled a small amount — not sufficient to actually trigger the machine into believing 
that it was a sufficient amount of volume" but the machine registered a result (R. 
137:102). It was this result, based on an insufficient sample, upon which the conviction 
was based because it was the only evidence introduced that Dunlap had "a blood or 
alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater[.]" UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-502(l)(c). 
Officer Aaron Thompson testified that he watched the numbers (on the digital screen) 
"increase from .000 up to . 180" immediately after he testified that the second test was 
"still an insufficient sample" (R. 138: 187). Upon being recalled, Deputy Randall 
testified that on the second test she witnessed the machine register a . 180 even though she 
earlier testified that Dunlap had again provided an insufficient sample (R. 138: 190; 137: 
103, 108). 
Unlike Vialpando, where the trial court was allowed discretion to consider two 
conflicting accounts and find that the police had properly observed the defendant, this 
case presents no alternative to the finding that the machine was not in proper working 
condition at the time of the test. Although Moore testified that the printer alignment did 
not have any effect on the accuracy of the machine he did not contradict the fact that the 
machine was not functioning properly. When Deputy Randall performed the two tests 
the printer malfunctioned both times and the cards on which the results were supposed to 
be printed, the very evidence generally admitted to prove intoxication, were illegible. 
Both Deputy Randall and Officer Thompson testified that on both tests, Dunlap failed to 
provide a sufficient sample. Given this testimony, the trial court erred in finding the test 
was administered correctly. It was undisputed that the machine was not in proper 
working condition at the time of the test and that the test was not administered correctly. 
The trial court's decision to admit the test results was an abuse of discretion and should 
be reversed. 
POINT II 
Evidence of the intoxilyzer test results should not have been admitted because the 
test failed to meet the statutory requirements under Utah Administrative Code 
R714-500-7 and because the results were admitted in violation of hearsay. 
As mentioned above, the Utah Administrative Code controlling breath alcohol test 
results provides that "[r]esults of breath alcohol concentration tests will be printed by the 
instrument." UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.714-500-7(C) (2008). Without a printed result a 
breath alcohol test is not valid according to the statute. The State did provide two 
"INTOXILYZER INSTRUMENT PRINTER CARDS" but they were essentially blank. 
See State's Exhibits 5 and 6. Deputy Randall testified that she did not know which card 
related to which test (R. 137:105). Both of the cards contain some evidence that the 
printer attempted to print the test results located on the upper left side of each card but the 
markings are illegible due to the printer malfunction. As a result, neither of the cards 
display any information relating to the breath alcohol concentration test results. 
Because there are no printed results, the breath alcohol concentration test results 
given at trial did not conform to the statutory requirements. Because the test results do 
not conform to the statutory requirements, they should not have been admissible. Dunlap 
asserts that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the intoxilyzer test results that 
failed to conform with the r.714-500-7(C). Because the results were not printed by the 
instrument, as required, the court should not have admitted them. As an interpretation of 
statute this decision by the trial court should be reviewed for correctness, which Dunlap 
argues warrants reversal for simply ignoring the statutory requirement. 
Dunlap further asserts that the results of the intoxilyzer breath test were 
improperly admitted because they violated the Utah Rules of Evidence. "In any... 
criminal action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person was operating 
or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or 
with a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, the results of a chemical test 
or tests... are admissible as evidence... except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or 
the constitution." UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-516(l). Dunlap contests that the intoxilyzer 
results should have been inadmissible at trial for violating the prohibition against hearsay 
according to Utah Rule of Evidence 802. 
"Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules." UTAH R. 
EVID. 802. Hearsay is an out of court statement, a written assertion, offered in evidence 
to prove the truth of the matter asserted. UTAH R. EVID. 801. A statement is an oral or 
written assertion. UTAH R. EVID. 801. An assertion is a declaration or allegation. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY "assertion" (8th ed. 2004). The rule forbidding the 
introduction of hearsay prohibits the admission of assertions offered to prove the truth of 
those assertions when the assertion was made in any circumstance other than at the trial 
or hearing. 
The results of a breath alcohol test are assertive statements because they are 
allegations of factual matters. The test results allege that the subject's blood alcohol level 
is a certain ratio. Breath test results are hearsay because they are out of court allegations 
admitted to prove the truth about subject's blood alcohol level. In this case the State 
offered the test results, the numbers communicated by the intoxilyzer machine, in order 
to prove that Dunlap had a "breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the 
time of the test[.]" UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-502. As hearsay these results may be 
admitted only under a hearsay exception. Dunlap objected to the admission of the test 
results as hearsay on several occasions (R. 137: 131; 138: 187, 202-03). 
The trial court found that because the machine could not be cross-examined it was 
not a declarant and thus its assertions were not hearsay (R. 138:202-3). This reasoning 
seems to suggest that the fact that a statement's source can be cross-examined determines 
whether or not a statement is hearsay. Dunlap contests that finding and argues that 
statements made by machines are hearsay so long as they are assertive out of court 
statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted as described by Rule 801. The 
need for a declarant that can be cross-examined in order to find hearsay is an inaccurate 
reading of the rule. 
In this case the hearsay are the testimony, by Deputy Randall and Officer 
Thompson, that they saw the intoxilyzer machine's digital readout asserting that Dunlap's 
breath alcohol content was . 18 at the time of the second test. This Court has found that 
the hearsay rules apply specifically to breath alcohol test results. Kehl v. Schwendiman, 
735 P.2d 413, 416 (Ut.App. 1987) was an appeal from an administrative driver's license 
suspension hearing. This Court, in finding that the residuum rule applied to suspension 
hearings, examined the admissibility of chemical breath test results. It found that Utah 
Code Annotated 41-6-44.3 (renumbered as § 41-6a-515) is a "recognized exception to the 
hearsay rule" so long as a proper foundation is laid by showing that the "judge finds that 
they were made in the regular course of the investigation" and that the "source of the 
information from which made and the method and circumstance of their preparation 
indicate trustworthiness." Kehl, 735 P.2d at 416, UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-515. See 
also Williams v. Schwendiman, 740 P.2d 1354 (1987) (where neither the public records or 
the trustworthiness exception to the hearsay rule applied to intoxilyzer test results or 
references to it by officers). Section 41-6a-515 allows the results of chemical breath tests 
to be admitted as an exception to hearsay subject to the requirements laid out in Point 1. 
Here, the proper foundation could not be laid because the evidence showed the 
machine was not in working condition and the results were not printed as required by § 
r.714-500-7(C). In this case, as in Kehl, where the proper foundation hasn't been laid to 
admit the test results under § 41-6a-515, the trial court also could not use the business 
records exception because the intoxilyzer machine's assertions testified to by Randall and 
Thompson were not shown to have been prepared in the regular practice of that business 
activity[.] UTAH R. EVID. 803(6). 
In Harry v. Schwendiman, 740 P.2d 1344, 1346 (Ut.App. 1987) the defendant 
appealed a denied petition for reversal after his driver's license was suspended for driving 
under the influence of alcohol. This Court again found, because the printed test results 
were not admissible on their own - failing under Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44 
(renumbered as § 44-6a-515) — the officer's sworn report alleging the defendant's test 
results was hearsay not admissible under the public records exception under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 803(8). 
At trial, because the printer had malfunctioned, and the cards did not contain any 
information, the only evidence of the intoxilyzer test results was introduced by police 
officers present when the test was administered. Had the results printed out of the 
machine the business records exception may have applied to the cards themselves but not 
to the witnesses' testimony about the results. Both Deputy Randall and Officer 
Thompson testified to the test results based on seeing the digital readout on the 
intoxilyzer machine but the cards were both essentially blank (R. 138: 187, 190). 
According to Harry and Kehl, statements by witnesses to chemical breath tests about the 
test results are hearsay and may only be admitted through an exception (R. 138:202). 
However, as in Harry and Kehl, no such exception applies in this case. 
If the results of the tests had been admitted according to the rule, as printouts of 
the machine's analysis created by the machine itself, and the required reliability evidence 
had been offered, then those results may have qualified for admission as a hearsay as 
exception recognized in Murray City. But, because the machine malfunctioned and the 
printed results of the tests were not available, testimonial evidence from Deputy Randall 
and Officer Thompson were hearsay not admissible under Murray City, under r. 714-500-
7(C) or § 41-6a-515, nor as public records or as business records exceptions to the 
hearsay rule. Because the results were hearsay without an exception the trial court should 
not have admitted testimony that related the alleged intoxilyzer test results. 
POINT III 
If the Court finds an error in the admission of the intoxilyzer test results Dunlap's 
conviction should be reversed because the admission was not a harmless error, 
"Harmless errors are errors which, although properly preserved below and 
presented on appeal, are sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." State v. 
Preece, 971 P.2d 1, 7 (Ut.App. 1998) {quoting State v. Villarreal 857 P.2d 949, 957-58 
(Ut.App. 1993)) (internal quotations omitted). However, if an error undermines the 
reviewing court's confidence in the verdict it is a harmful error. Preece, 971 P.2d at 7. 
In this case Dunlap preserved his objection to the introduction of intoxilyzer 
evidence by objecting each time the State offered evidence of the test results, both 
through Deputy Randall and Officer Thompson (R. 137: 102, 131; 138: 187). Dunlap 
alleges that the improper admission of the intoxilyzer test results likely affected the 
outcome of his trial. This position is supported by State v. Kinne, 2001 UT App 373, 
where the State challenged the district court's exclusion of chemical breath test results for 
a lack of evidence of accuracy and reliability of the testing instrumentality, proof of 
maintenance, and competence in administration of the tests. The trial court excluded the 
breath test results and subsequently ruled that the remaining evidence (speeding, slow 
and slurred speech, admitting to having 2 beers, the smell of alcohol, and inconclusive 
field sobriety tests) was not sufficient to find probable cause that he was incapable of 
safely operating a vehicle. This Court upheld the trial court's finding that there was not 
even probable cause based on the remaining evidence. 
Here, with very similar facts to Kinne, Dunlap argues that the lower standard for 
harmful error should be satisfied. At trial the State introduced evidence through Roger 
Randall that Dunlap had stopped his truck in the road and then backed the truck off the 
road into the grass and weeds (R. 137: 56-58). There was evidence that Dunlap's speech 
was slurred and slow (R. 137:81). Dunlap admitted to having one beer (R. 137:79). Both 
Roger and Judy Randall smelled alcohol (R. 137: 58, 79). Deputy Randall attempted to 
administer the field sobriety tests but failed to complete them. Deputy Randall 
administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus but failed to determine whether or not 
Dunlap could actually see the object (R. 137: 84, 86, 113). The other field sobriety tests 
were not performed (R. 137: 88). 
Under Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-502(b) a person may be convicted if the 
State proves he was "under the influence of alcohol... to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle[.]" The only testimony relating to Dunlap's 
operation of his vehicle was Roger Randall's statement that Dunlap's truck was "in the 
road stopped about halfway down the hill" (R. 137: 56), that it turned sideways across the 
road and backed off the road into the gutter (R. 137: 57), and that "he had to go perfectly 
straight off for that truck not to roll over when he went off of that hill" (R. 137: 58). 
Dunlap asserts that as in Kinne, the evidence against him outside of the intoxilyzer 
results was minimal at best, and that the error in admitting testimony as to the intoxilyzer 
tests is harmful because without it there exists a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Dunlap asks this Court to reverse his conviction on the charge of Driving Under 
the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs and remand the case to the Fifth District Court for 
further proceedings. 
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ADDENDA 
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
R714-500-7. Breath Alcohol Concentration Test Analytical Results. 
A. The instrument should be operated by either a certified operator or technician. 
B. Breath specimen analyzed for breath alcohol concentration shall be essentially alveolar or end 
expiratory in composition according to the analysis method utilized. 
1. The results of tests to determine breath alcohol concentration shall be expressed as 
equivalent grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
2. Analytical results on a breath alcohol concentration test shall be recorded using 
terminology established by State statute and reported to three decimal places. 
a. For example, a result of 0.237g/210L shall be reported as 0.237. 
C. Results of breath alcohol concentration tests will be printed by the instrument. 
D. Results are deemed to be an exact representation of breath alcohol concentration at the time of 
test. 
E. The printed results of a breath alcohol concentration test will be retained by the operator or the 
operator's individual agencies' designated record or evidence custodian. 
F. Instrument internal standards on a breath alcohol concentration test do not have to be recorded 
numerically. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
U.C.A. § 41-6a-502. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both 
or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration. 
(1) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state if the 
person: 
(a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical test shows that 
the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time 
of the test; 
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and 
any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or 
(c) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of 
operation or actual physical control. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of 
blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters 
of breath. 
(3) A violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance similar to this section 
adopted in compliance with Section 41-6a-510. 
U.C.A. § 41-6a-515. Standards for chemical breath or oral fluids analysis—Evidence 
(1) The commissioner of the department shall establish standards for the administration and 
interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath or oral fluids, including standards of 
training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person was operating or in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or operating 
with a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or 
records of acts, conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was made and the instrument used 
was accurate, according to standards established in Subsection (1), are admissible if: 
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the investigation at or 
about the time of the act, condition, or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which made and the method and circumstances of 
their preparation indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under Subsection (1) and the conditions of 
Subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption that the test results are valid and further 
foundation for introduction of the evidence is unnecessary. 
U.C.A. § 41-6a-516. Admissibility of chemical test results in actions for driving under the 
influence—Weight of evidence. 
(l)(a) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person 
was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs or with a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, the results of a chemical 
test or tests as authorized in Section 41-6a-520 are admissible as evidence. 
(b)(i) In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section 41-6a-520 does not render the 
results of a chemical test inadmissible. 
(ii) Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content is 
admissible except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution. 
(2) This section does not prevent a court from receiving otherwise admissible evidence as to a 
defendant's blood or breath alcohol level or drug level at the time relevant to the alleged offense. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 801 - Definitions 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a 
person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at 
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject 
to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with 
the declarant's testimony or the witness denies having made the statement or has 
forgotten, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an 
express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper 
influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the 
person; or 
(2) Admission by Party-Opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the 
party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a 
statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a 
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, 
or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of 
the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a 
statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. 
Rule 803 - Hearsay Exceptions 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a 
witness: (irrelevant sections omitted) 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data 
compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the 
time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a 
regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to 
make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the 
custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 
902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of information or the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this 
paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every 
kind, whether or not conducted for profit. 
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, 
of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) 
matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, 
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law 
enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in 
criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authonty 
granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
